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THE CONFIDENCE GAME: MANIPULATION OF THE
MARKETS BY GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES
CAROLINE BRADLEY*
The global financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007' has focused the
attention of governments and international financial institutions on the regulation of
financial institutions to an unusual degree.2 In response to the crisis, the G20 and
national governments are developing new mechanisms for ensuring financial stability
in order to try to prevent similar problems from arising in the future.3 Concerns
about the financial viability of banks and about the value of asset-backed securities
issued by financial institutions were reflected in banks' share prices. The crisis
represents a massive global loss of confidence in the ability of the world's financial
markets to value financial assets appropriately, which has raised a range of issues for
legislators and regulators.
The global financial crisis thus renders visible and urgent a perennial
(although often ignored) tension in financial regulation with respect to the extent to
which governments should intervene to fix the financial markets.4 Governments
have reacted to the crisis with short-term emergency measures and longer-term
initiatives. In the short term, governments have provided financial support to
troubled financial institutions, and they have implemented regulatory fixes by varying
rules on short selling,5 deposit insurance,6 and accounting7 in order to calm the
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, PO Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL, 33124,
cbradley@law.miami.edu ; http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net.
1 Bank for International Settlements, 78th Annual Report: 1 April 2007-31 March 2008, at 3 (June 30,
2008), http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2008e.pdf ("The simmering turmoil in financial markets
came to the boil on 9 August 2007.").
e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
2
(2009), available at
SUPERVISION
AND
REGULATION,
FINANCIAL
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf (proposing reforms to "build a
new foundation for financial regulation and supervision); HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL
available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
7667
(July
2009),
MARKETS,
CM
reformingjfinancial-markets080709.pdf.
2 See,

REBUILDING

3 See, e.g., G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at

http://www.g20.org (search "Strengthening
commitment to reform).

the Financial

System")

(setting out the

G20's

4 See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Suspension and Disbelief (Or, How Managed Should a Market Be?), 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 597 (1996) (criticizing the use of trading halts by regulators).

5 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATION SHO: RECENT ACTIONS APPEAR TO
HAVE INITIALLY REDUCED FAILURES TO DELIVER, BUT MORE INDUSTRY GUIDANCE Is NEEDED,
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financial markets.8 These short-term measures have been designed to fix the
financial markets by controlling behaviors considered to be harmful in the context of
the crisis, such as short selling, and by providing regulatory and financial support for
stock prices.
In normal times, governmental and self-regulatory authorities justify
regulation of the financial markets by reference to the need to maintain confidence in
the markets. 9 But governmental action to protect investor confidence is generally
characterized as action to guarantee the integrity of the markets, meaning that
regulation should ensure that pricing in the markets is accurate. Investor protection
is necessary, in part, because protecting investors' interests encourages confidence
and more investment. Regulations that target fraud, insider trading, and market
manipulation are designed to maintain confidence in the financial markets," as are

GAO-09-483, 5 (May 2009), (describing SEC emergency action to curb naked short-selling).
6 The crisis revealed issues with respect to confidence of depositors in depository institutions,
resulting in moves to enhance depositor protection. See, e.g., Sebastian Schich, FinancialCrisis: Deposit
Insurance and Related FinancialSafeyNet Aspects, 95 OECDJ: FIN. MKT. TRENDS (2008/2)
7 See,

e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB
Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting, No. 2008-234 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm; see also Staff Position, Fed. Accounting
Standards Bd., Determining the Fair Value of a Financial Asset When the Market for That Asset Is
Not Active, No. FAS 157-3 (Oct. 10, 2008); Staff Position, Fed. Accounting Standards Bd.,
Determining Fair Value When the Volume and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have
Significantly Decreased and Identifying Transactions That Are Not Orderly, No. FAS 157-4 (Apr. 9,
2009).
8 Regulators have also reacted to the crisis by intensifying their efforts with respect to enforcement.
See, e.g., Yin Wilczek, SEC Enforcement: In Mid-Year Reviews, Lanyers Give Enforcement Division High Marks
for Revamp, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), July 15, 2009; Financial Services Authority, Annual Report 2008/09,
8 Uune 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk (search "2008-09 Annual Report') ("During the past year, we
have demonstrated our resolve to bring credible deterrence to bear on financial crime. On tackling
market misconduct, we secured two convictions and a custodial sentence in our first ever insider
dealing criminal trial - a clear warning that wrongdoers who cheat the market will be held to
account.').
9 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, supra note 8, at 8 ("FSMA also sets the FSA a consumer
protection objective. Maintaining financial stability and confidence is in itself a crucial means by
which we pursue this objective .... '). Cf Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against
Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 319 (2009) (citing "the underlying philosophy of

the Exchange Act: that prevention of fraud, maintaining of fair and orderly markets, and assurance of
honest corporate disclosure are the essential underpinnings of capital formation.').
10 See, e.g., Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003
on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 46 OFFICIALJ. EUR. UNION (L 96) 16,

17 (2003) ("The objective of legislation against insider dealing is the same as that of legislation against
market manipulation: to ensure the integrity of Community financial markets and to enhance investor
confidence in those markets.').
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rules that are designed to prevent financial market participants from putting their
own interests before those of their clients." Such rules are designed to maintain
confidence by ensuring the integrity of the markets. Because the maintenance of
confidence is at the heart of much financial regulation, a massive lack of confidence
seems to be2 a significant market or regulatory failure justifying governmental
intervention.'
Governmental action designed to stop some market participants from
manipulating the markets at the expense of others, leading to a decline in confidence
in the markets, is geared to preserve confidence by preserving the integrity of the
markets. Emergency amendments to rules on short selling were motivated by a
concern to prevent market manipulation by market participants. 3 However, some
governmental responses to the financial market crisis seem to treat the preservation
of confidence in the markets (rather than the preservation of market integrity) as the
fundamental concern of regulation. This is a risky strategy because adopting
emergency measures to manipulate the markets in the interests of improving
confidence risks undermining the ability of regulators to control the behavior of
financial institutions for the future in any meaningful way. If governments react to a
crisis by misapplying existing rules in the interests of maintaining confidence, they
may create expectations among market participants that they will react to future
crises in the same way. Market participants' incentives to comply with the rules
could be reduced, and they might experience increased confidence that they can
make sure the rules will work to their advantage. 4
Emergency measures must often be adopted swiftly, and they may be
implemented without the level of consultation that governments and supranational
authorities typically argue is necessary.' 5 They may therefore seem less legitimate
11Scandals involving Ponzi schemes such as the Madoff scandal harm confidence. See, e.g., Stephen
Joyce, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years in Prison As Judge Calls Crimes ExtraordinarilyEvil', SEC. L. DAILY
(BNA), June 30, 2009 ("In announcing his sentence, Judge Denny Chin said while the actual amount
of money stolen by Madoff is still in dispute, the crime's magnitude was nevertheless 'off the charts.'
Madoff's crimes, additionally, were not solely about money but addressed fundamental breaches of
trust and fidelity, Chin said.").
12 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2 ("We must act now to restore confidence

in the integrity of our financial system.").
13See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 5.
Who Nationalized Whom?, RGE MONITOR, July 17, 2009,
Cf Simon Johnson,
("[A]ccess
http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarkets-monitor/257307/who-nationalizedwhom
to contingent (sic) state capital-on-amazing-terms is the ironic basis of modern financial power.');
Paul Krugman, The Joy ofSachs, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A23.
14

15The UK's Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, 2008 Ch. 2, which had its first reading in
Parliament on February 19, 2008 and obtained Royal Assent on February 21, 2008, gave the Treasury
broad powers to amend primary legislation. This power has been superceded by a power contained in
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than other, more openI , debated measures. It is common for rules of financial
regulation to be adopted speedily in response to a crisis. However, rules adopted in
such circumstances are vulnerable to subsequent criticism, particularly the critique
that politics, rather than good, policy were responsible for generating the new rules.' 6
Where governmental initiatives are designed to manipulate confidence in the
markets, rather than to create the conditions for longer-term confidence in those
markets, they may, in the end, undermine confidence. In particular, support schemes
for financial institutions that place over-generous valuations on bank assets when
they are purchased by governmental authorities," or allow financial institutions to
exit from the schemes at too favorable a price, 8 and governmental reluctance to
impose aggressive regulation on entities whose actions contributed to the crisis, such
as credit rating agencies, 19 raise questions about whether the responsible
governments have any real fundamental commitment to sound valuation and risk
section 75 of the Banking Act 2009, 2009 Ch. 1. Cf House of Lords Select Comm. on the
Constitution, Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards, HE 116-1, 1 (2009)
(discussing 'constitutional issues that may arise when there is resort to emergency legislation,' [sic]
and, in particular, 'situations where bills receive an expedited passage through parliament."').
Consider, for example, the criticisms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted very quickly in
response to the collapse of a number of large US corporations, including Enron. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making ofQuack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528
(2005) ("[T]he corporate governance provisions were not a focus of careful deliberation by Congress.
SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media
frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases."); Larry E. Ribstein, Market
vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:A Crilique of the Sarbanes-Oxly Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46
(2002) ("[Tjhose who see corporate fraud as a wedge to push a broader regulatory agenda applied
significant pressure in favor of regulation.").
16

The U.S. Treasury's process for establishing valuations for warrants that financial institutions
repurchase from the Government includes provision for independent appraisals. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T
17

OF THE TREASURY, SECTION 105(A) TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM REPORT TO CONGRESS
FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1, 2009 TO JUNE 30, 2009, 5 (July 10, 2009), available at

http://www.financialstability.gov (search "105 Congressional Reports"; then follow 7/10/2009
Hyperlink) (describing the process). Cf Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson & Se Hoon Lee,
Dealing with the FinancalCrisis and Thinking about the Exit Strategy, 96 OECD J: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 3
(2009/1) ("Because of great uncertainty about valuation, the risk to the taxpayer of buying at too high
a price in the emergency measures phase is quite high.").
18 See, e.g., U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: STATUS OF

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES,

GAO-09-920T, 7 (July 22,

2009), ("We recommended that Treasury consider publicly disclosing additional details regarding the
warrant repurchase process, such as the initial price offered by the issuing entity and Treasury's
independent valuations, to demonstrate Treasury's attempts to maximize the benefit received for the
warrants on behalf of the taxpayer.').
See, e.g., James Kwak, TARP for Rating Agences, RGE MONITOR, Jun. 19, 2009,
http://www.rgemonitor.com (search "TARP for Rating Agencies"; then follow hyperlink under
"Matching Articles from RGE Content').
'9
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assessment practices. Debates about whether financial institutions should be
required to follow mark-to-market accounting requirements during periods of
market volatility raise similar questions. 0
Short-term emergency measures adopted in response to the crisis risk
undermining the effectiveness of more considered longer-term measures. Some
commentators have emphasized the need for a response that goes beyond immediate
responses to the crisis and that engages in real reform of financial regulation.2'
Others have suggested that regulators must keep their new resolutions to be tougher
enforcers of the rules after the immediate crisis is over.22 Market participants that are
confident that governments will consistently prioritize maintaining confidence over
maintaining market integrity will adjust their lobbying strategies accordingly.
The current debates about how to structure financial regulation and
accounting requirements in the context of the crisis and for the future illustrate that
different groups have dramatically different views about how the financial markets
should be regulated. For example, while some have argued forcefully that fair value
accounting contributed to market instability, others argue with as much force that23
fair value accounting requirements are essential to protect the interests of investors.
International institutions have contributed to this debate. For example, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision has stated that international accounting
standards should "recognise [sic] that fair value is not effective when markets
[become] dislocated or are illiquid. 2 4
20 See, e.g., Statement from the Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators, Application of and Disclosures Related
to the Reclassification
of Financial Instruments,
2 (July 15, 2009),
available at
http://www.cesr.eu/popup2.php?id=5802 ("If no reclassifications had been made, the total amount
reported in the profit and loss account and in other comprehensive income would have been 28
billion euros lower than the figures actually reported.").
21

See, e.g., Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 17, at 1 ("Crisis measures need to be accompanied by

genuine reform of the regulations and other incentive structures that caused the crisis.").
22 See, e.g., House of Commons Treasury Comm., Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision, HC 767,
3 (2009) ("The FSA must develop the confidence to take unpopular decisions when the economic
boom begins again, in the face of both industry and the political class.").
23

See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting, 1 (Dec. 30,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf ("In the months
preceding passage of the Act, some asserted that fair value accounting, along with the accompanying
guidance on measuring fair value under SFAS No. 157, contributed to instability in our financial
markets .... Just as vocal were other market participants, particularly investors, who stated that fair
value accounting serves to enhance the transparency of financial information provided to the
public.").
24

Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39, 2 (2009),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl6l.pdf?noframes=l. The G20 has endorsed these principles. See
G20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Declaration on Further Steps to
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Policymakers have suggested long-term changes to financial regulation that
involve new varieties of interference with market behavior by governments. For
example, regulators are beginning to regulate compensation arrangements for
executives in financial firms.25 Policymakers are discussing ideas of regulating by
reference to substance rather than form26 and of regulating previously unregulated
products.27 Such proposals are being justified not only by the need to ensure the
stability of the financial system and the integrity of the markets, but also by the need
to maintain confidence. 28 However, market participants counter these proposals
with arguments that they will make it impossible for firms subject to the new rules to
compete effectively with firms established in other jurisdictions.2 9
At the domestic level, policymaking with respect to financial regulation tends
to be a matter for technocrats in normal conditions, but it becomes more political in
times of crisis or scandal. Crises may prompt new consumer-friendly regulations,
but they may also encourage financial firms to dedicate increased resources to
lobbying.3" Lobbying has had a significant impact on financial regulation in the
past,3' and it is not yet clear whether the crisis has really changed attitudes toward
regulation in any significant or lasting way.
Strengthen the Financial System (Sept. 4-5, 2009), http://www.g20.org (search "Declaration of
Further Steps").
25s ee, e.g., Fin. Serv. Authority, Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services: Feedback on

CP09/10 and Final Rules, Policy Statement 09/15 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk
(Search "PS 09/15").
26

See, e.g., House of Commons Treasury Comm., supra note 22, at 27.

27

See, e.g., id. at 25-26.

See, e.g., Technical Comm. of the Int'l Org. of Sec. Comm'ns, Unregulated Financial Markets and
Products, 5 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/Iibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD30l.pdf
('The recommendations made are aimed at supporting investor confidence in these markets and at
improving the functioning, integrity and oversight of unregulated financial markets and products.').
28

29

See, e.g., Fin. Serv. Authority, supranote 25, at 4.

For example, during 2009, CRAs have dedicated significant financial resources to lobbying for
financial regulation. See, e.g., Michael Beckel, CapitalEye Report: Credit Rating Agencies Under Fire Drop
More Dollars on PohficalInfluence, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009 /05/capital-eye-report-creditrati.html (May 14, 2009, 16:02 EST) ("The 10 firms accredited by the SEC to issue credit ratings spent
$370,000 on lobbying during the first three months of 2009, an increase of 42 percent compared to
the 1st Quarter of 2008, the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics has found. Seventy-eight
percent of that total comes from the so-called "Big Three" credit rating firms, whose inflated ratings
of risky securities reportedly helped precipitate the financial crisis, according to some.").
30

31 See, e.g., Poser, spra note 9, at 324

("[Ihe SEC must again see itself as the defender of investors
and a counterweight to securities-industry and corporate lobbyists, who have the money, the lawyers,
and the political influence to defeat or water down regulatory proposals. On the federal level at least,
the SEC is the investor's only champion.').
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Because the financial crisis is global, governments have stated publicly that
they accept that the regulatory solutions should be the products of global as well as
domestic processes. 12 The Basel Committee's intervention in the debate about fair
value accounting illustrates that it is not a purely domestic issue. The SEC has
recognized that fair value accounting involves a debate that "extends beyond national
borders."33 Governments of the G20 countries have made public commitments to
strengthen international cooperation with respect to financial stability and prudential
regulation, and have agreed to work together in other areas, including the supervision
of hedge funds and credit rating agencies. More than merely agreeing to increased
cooperation, the G20 also committed to "implement international financial standards
(including the 12 key International Standards and Codes)."34
It is possible that the need to cooperate at the international level may help to
constrain domestic policymakers and discourage the adoption of manipulative
measures aimed to boost short-term investor confidence in domestic markets.
Certainly, the language of public statements about the reform of financial regulation
by groups such as the G20, the International Financial Institutions, and
supranational regulatory networks suggests that there is a genuine transnational
commitment to effective regulation of the financial markets. On the other hand,
implementation of the transnational commitment is to be carried out in multiple
levels of fora, which are less transparent to citizen-voters than to domestic
legislatures, and where well-resourced financial firms and their trade associations can
participate actively in the negotiation of the new standards.3"
But whether new rules of financial regulation are generated in domestic or
transnational fora, it is important to ensure that the rules promote market integrity
and thereby increase confidence in the financial markets, rather than promoting
confidence and ultimately contributing to undermining market integrity.

32

See, e.g., G20, supra note 3.

33U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 23, at 2.

34G20, supra note 3, at 1.
Caroline Bradley, Financial Trade Associalions and Mulilevel Regulalion, in MULTILEVEL
EU: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GLOBAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL
NORMATIVE PROCESSES (Andreas Follesdal, Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2008).
35 Cf

REGULATION AND THE

